

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

ANTHONY L. BLANFORD and
JOHN K. BELLVILLE,

Plaintiffs,

VS.

MICHAEL J. DUNLEAVY, in his individual and official capacities; TUCKERMAN BABCOCK; and the STATE OF ALASKA,

Defendants.

Case No. 3:19-cv-00036-JWS

**ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT**
[Docs. 54, 55]

I. MOTIONS PRESENTED

At docket 54, Plaintiffs, Anthony L. Blanford and John K. Bellville (collectively “Plaintiffs”), filed a motion for summary judgment on their claims that Defendants, Governor Michael J. Dunleavy, Tuckerman Babcock, and the State of Alaska (collectively “Defendants”), violated their rights under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 5 of the Alaska Constitution. Defendants responded at docket 61. Plaintiffs replied at docket 64. Defendants filed their cross-motion for summary judgment at docket 55. Plaintiffs responded at docket 62. Defendants replied at docket 63. Oral argument was requested, but was denied at docket 66 because it would not be of further assistance to the Court’s determination.

II. BACKGROUND

In November 2018, Defendant Michael J. Dunleavy was elected Governor of the State of Alaska. He selected Defendant Tuckerman Babcock to serve as the chair of his transition team. Part of any transition process requires appointing subordinate executive branch officials, which necessarily involves replacing officials that served under the prior administration. In past transitions, incoming administrations requested resignations from around 250 employees.¹ Governor Dunleavy significantly broadened the scope of this practice when, on November 16, 2018, Mr. Babcock, as the chair of the Governor-Elect's transition team, sent a memorandum to most of the state's at-will employees—numbering at least 800 and including not only department heads, but also criminal prosecutors, state attorneys, medical doctors, psychiatrists, pharmacists, fiscal analysts, tax code specialists, investment managers, geologists, accountants, IT professionals, and administrative law judges.² The memorandum required employees to submit a resignation, along with a statement of interest in remaining employed with the new administration. The memorandum stated in part as follows:

In the coming weeks, the incoming administration will be making numerous personnel decisions. Governor-Elect Dunleavy is committed to bringing his own brand of energy and direction to state government. It is not Governor-Elect Dunleavy's intent to minimize the hard work and effort put forth by current employees, but rather to ensure that any Alaskan who wishes to serve is given proper and fair consideration.

¹ Dockets 54-4; 54-5.

² Dockets 54-5; 54-6; 54-7.

1 As is customary during the transition from one
2 administration to the next, we hereby request that you
3 submit your resignation in writing on or before
4 November 30, 2018 to Team2018@alaska.gov. If you
5 wish to remain in your current position, please make
6 your resignation effective upon acceptance by the
7 Dunleavy administration.

8 Acceptance of your resignation will not be
9 automatic, and consideration will be given to your
10 statement of interest in continuing in your current or
11 another appointment-based state position. Please also
12 include your email address and phone contact so that
13 you can be reached to discuss your status directly.

14 Governor-Elect Dunleavy is encouraging you
15 and all Alaskans to submit their names for consideration
16 for service to our great state. . . .³

17 The memorandum was accompanied by a resignation form, which included a sentence
18 where employees had to choose whether or not they wanted to be considered for their
19 position with the Dunleavy administration.⁴

20 Plaintiffs were among the employees who received the resignation
21 memorandum. At that time, Dr. Blanford was the chief of psychiatry and Dr. Bellville
22 was a staff psychiatrist at Alaska Psychiatric Institute (“API”), the State’s psychiatric
23 hospital. Dr. Blanford was hired in 2016 as a staff psychiatrist and later was promoted
24 to the chief of psychiatry position. Dr. Bellville started at API in the spring of 2018.
25 Dr. Blanford was surprised that he received the resignation request and Dr. Bellville
26 initially disregarded his receipt of the memorandum as a mistake, because they did not
27

28 ³ Docket 54-1.

⁴ Docket 54-3.

1 consider their jobs to be political in nature and both were professionally well-regarded
2 at API.⁵
3

4 The demand for the resignations of all at-will employees was reported in
5 the local newspaper. Governor Dunleavy explained his decision to a reporter: “We
6 want to give people an opportunity to think about whether they want to remain with
7 this administration and be able to have a conversation with us.”⁶ Mr. Babcock was
8 reported as saying as follows:

9 [Governor Dunleavy] just wants all of the state
10 employee who are at-will . . . to affirmatively say, “Yes,
11 I want to work for the Dunleavy administration,” . . . Not
12 just bureaucracy staying in place, but sending out the
13 message, “Do you want to work on this agenda, do you
14 want to work in this administration? Just let us know.”
15 . . .

16 . . . I do think this is something bold and different, and
17 it’s not meant to intimidate or scare anybody. It’s meant
18 to say, “Do you want to be a part of this?”
19 . . .

20 If you don’t want to express a positive desire, just
21 don’t submit your letter of resignation, . . . [a]nd then
22 you’ve let us know you just wish to be terminated.⁷

23 Upon reading these comments, Dr. Blanford became concerned about the propriety of
24 having to sign what he considered a “pledge . . . to a political agenda” in his role as
25 chief of psychiatry at API.⁸ He voiced his opposition to the resignation demand in a
26

27 ⁵ Dockets 54-14 at ¶ 9; 54-15 at ¶ 8; 54-13 at 8; 56-6 at 2.
28 ⁶ Docket 54-4.

⁷ *Id.*

⁸ Docket 54-14 at ¶¶ 10-13.

letter to the editor of the newspaper.⁹ He indicated in the published letter that he wanted to keep his job at API, but would not submit a “symbolic gesture of deference” in order to keep it.¹⁰ He stated he was hired for his expertise and not his “political allegiance,” and that he could not voice his support for the administration’s agenda if it involved “further cuts and hiring freezes, because that’s not what’s needed at API at this time.”¹¹ He stated his “moral allegiance” is to the mentally ill and staff who care for them and that it was his belief that “[p]olitics have already cut deeply into our ability to care for the mentally ill.”¹² Dr. Bellville agreed with Dr. Blanford’s position.¹³

Neither psychiatrist submitted his resignation. In the morning of December 3, 2018, the day Governor Dunleavy was sworn into office, Mr. Babcock notified Plaintiffs of their termination from service effective at noon that same day.¹⁴ While no basis was provided in the notifications, Defendants concede that Plaintiffs were fired because they failed to submit their resignations.¹⁵ Administration officials later requested to meet with Plaintiffs to encourage them to stay at API, but maintained the condition that Plaintiffs reapply with the new administration.¹⁶ Plaintiffs understood that they could have their jobs on the original condition—by submitting a

⁹ Docket 54-21.

¹⁰ *Id.*

¹¹ *Id.*

¹² *Id.*

¹³ Docket 54-15 at ¶¶ 10–13.

¹⁴ Dockets 54-22; 54-23.

¹⁵ Docket 58 at ¶ 3.

¹⁶ Dockets 56-8 at 4–5; 54-25 at 9; 54-14 at ¶ 20; 54-15 at ¶ 18.

1 letter of intent or otherwise specifically articulating their interest in being employed at
2 API under the new administration, which they again refused to do, believing the
3 demand to be a political one to which they objected.¹⁷
4

5 This lawsuit followed. Plaintiffs assert a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against
6 Defendants for violation of their First Amendment rights, as well as a free speech claim
7 under Article I, § 5 of the Alaska Constitution. Plaintiffs also allege a breach of the
8 implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under state law. They seek monetary
9 relief, as well as injunctive and declaratory relief.
10

11 Plaintiffs now seek summary judgment on their federal and state free
12 speech claims. Defendants, in turn, seek summary judgment on these same claims.
13 They also ask for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' state claim for the breach of the
14 covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
15

17 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

18 Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine dispute as
19 to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."¹⁸ The
20 materiality requirement ensures that "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the
21 outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of
22 summary judgment."¹⁹ Ultimately, "summary judgment will not lie if the . . . evidence
23 is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."²⁰
24

27 ¹⁷ Dockets 54-14 at ¶¶ 20–21; 54-15 at ¶¶ 18–19.
28 ¹⁸ Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

¹⁹ *Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
²⁰ *Id.*

1 However, summary judgment is mandated “against a party who fails to make a
2 showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case,
3 and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”²¹
4

5 The moving party has the burden of showing that there is no genuine
6 dispute as to any material fact.²² Where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of
7 proof at trial on a dispositive issue, the moving party need not present evidence to show
8 that summary judgment is warranted; it need only point out the lack of any genuine
9 dispute as to material fact.²³ Once the moving party has met this burden, the
10 nonmoving party must set forth evidence of specific facts showing the existence of a
11 genuine issue for trial.²⁴ All evidence presented by the non-movant must be believed
12 for purposes of summary judgment, and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in
13 favor of the non-movant.²⁵ However, the non-moving party may not rest upon mere
14 allegations or denials, but must show that there is sufficient evidence supporting the
15 claimed factual dispute to require a fact-finder to resolve the parties’ differing versions
16 of the truth at trial.²⁶ “[W]hen simultaneous cross-motions for summary judgment on
17 the same claim are before the court, the court must consider the appropriate evidentiary
18

21 *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

22 *Id.* at 323.

23 *Id.* at 323–25.

24 *Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 248–49.

25 *Id.* at 255.

26 *Id.* at 248–49.

material identified and submitted in support of both motions, and in opposition to both motions, before ruling on each of them.”²⁷

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiffs' § 1983 Claim Based on the First Amendment

Plaintiffs assert their First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a private right of action for those plaintiffs seeking to redress and remedy constitutional wrongs caused by those acting “under the color of state law.”²⁸ “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of State law.”²⁹ Based on Eleventh Amendment considerations, a state, its agencies, and officials acting in their official capacity cannot be sued under § 1983.³⁰ An exception exists for § 1983 claims brought against state officials sued in their official capacity for prospective injunctive or declaratory relief.³¹ These claims, however, must be brought against state officials with the ability to provide injunctive relief in their official capacities.³² Claims seeking

²⁷ *Fair Hous. Council of Riverside Cnty., Inc. v. Riverside Two*, 249 F.3d 1132, 1134 (9th Cir. 2001).

28 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

²⁹ *Long v. Cnty. of L.A.*, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006).

³⁰ *Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police*, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); *Wolfe v. Strankman*, 392 F.3d 358, 364 (9th Cir. 2004).

³¹ *Will*, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10 (“Of course a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because ‘official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the state.’” (quoting *Kentucky v. Graham*, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985))); *Flint v. Dennison*, 488 F.3d 816, 824–25 (9th Cir. 2007).

³² *Hartmann v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab.*, 707 F.3d 1114, 1127 (9th Cir. 2013).

monetary damages may only be brought against a state official if the official is sued in his or her individual capacity and such claims are subject to a possible qualified immunity defense.³³ For these personal-capacity claims, Eleventh Amendment immunity issues are not implicated because the claim is actually against the individual and not the state.³⁴ To establish personal liability for damages under § 1983, it is enough to show that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right.³⁵

Under these principles, Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim against the State of Alaska itself is not viable. The claim may be brought against Defendant Dunleavy in his official capacity for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief, and against the individual Defendants in their personal capacities for damages. Whether Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on this § 1983 claim depends on whether there has been an underlying First Amendment violation and, if so, whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

1. First Amendment in the public employment context

Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim against Defendants falls within the ambit of case law governing First Amendment rights in relation to public employment. "The Court has rejected for decades now the proposition that a public employee has no right to a government job and so cannot complain that termination violates First Amendment

³³ *Suever v. Connell*, 579 F.3d 1047, 1060–61 (9th Cir. 2009); *Kentucky v. Graham*, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985).

³⁴ *Suever*, 579 F.3d at 1060.

³⁵ *Id.*

rights . . .”³⁶ Under the Supreme Court’s “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine, “the government ‘may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected . . . freedom of speech’ even if he has no entitlement to that benefit.”³⁷ Based on this doctrine, “[i]t is by now black letter law that ‘a state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.’”³⁸ This means that “[a]bsent some reasonably appropriate requirement, government may not make public employment subject to the express condition of political beliefs or prescribed expression.”³⁹

11 Stemming from these principals are two types of cases—those falling
12
13 under the *Elrod/Branti*⁴⁰ line of patronage cases, and those under the *Pickering*⁴¹ free
14 speech retaliation cases. Under *Elrod/Branti*, as a general rule, public employees
15 cannot be terminated based upon their political associations.⁴² Such patronage
16 practices impermissibly infringe upon public employees' First Amendment rights.
17
18 “The threat of dismissal for failure to provide [support for the favored political party]
19 unquestionably inhibits protected belief and association, and dismissal for failure to
20 provide support only penalizes its exercise.”⁴³

³⁶ *O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake*, 518 U.S. 712, 716 (1996).

³⁷ *Bd. of Comm’rs, Wabaunsee Cnty. v. Umbehr*, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) (quoting *Perry v. Sindermann*, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).

³⁸ *Nichols v. Dancer*, 657 F.3d 929, 932 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting *Connick v. Myers*, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983)).

³⁹ *O'Hare*, 518 U.S. at 717.

⁴⁰ *Elrod v. Burns*, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); *Branti v. Finkel*, 445 U.S. 507 (1980).

⁴¹ *Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cnty., Ill.*, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).

⁴² *Biggs v. Best, Best & Krieger*, 189 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 1999).

⁴³ *Elrod*, 427 U.S. at 359 (plurality opinion).

1 *Pickering* retaliation cases involve situations where a government
2 employer takes an adverse employment action against an employee in response to that
3 employee's speech. Under these cases, it is acknowledged that the government cannot
4 unduly abridge employees' free speech rights, but nonetheless has broader power to
5 restrict the speech of its employees than the speech of its constituents given the
6 different interests at play. As a result, unlike the *Elrod/Branti* cases "where the raw
7 test of political affiliation suffice[s] to show a constitutional violation," these speech-
8 related cases require the application of a balancing test developed in *Pickering* to
9 determine whether the employee's speech is constitutionally protected.⁴⁴ Under the
10 balancing test, the court must consider "the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in
11 commenting upon matters of public concern, and the interest of the State, as an
12 employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
13 employees."⁴⁵ This balancing test is also applied in "hybrid speech/association"
14 claims, where speech is inextricably linked with the associational activity in question.⁴⁶

15 Under both types of cases—whether involving political affiliation or
16 political speech—an exception is carved out for those employees holding
17 policymaking positions; such employees may be fired for "purely political reasons."⁴⁷
18 In the Ninth Circuit, "an employee's status as a policymaking or confidential employee
19 [is] dispositive of *any* First Amendment retaliation claim[,] not just a claim based
20

21 ⁴⁴ *O'Hare*, 518 U.S. at 719.

22 ⁴⁵ *Pickering*, 391 U.S. at 568.

23 ⁴⁶ *Hudson v. Craven*, 403 F.3d 691, 695–98 (9th Cir. 2005); *Candelaria v. City of Tolleson, Ariz.*, 721 Fed. Appx. 588, 590 n.1 (9th Cir. 2017).

24 ⁴⁷ *Hobler v. Brueher*, 325 F.3d 1145, 1150 (9th Cir. 2003).

1 solely on political affiliation.⁴⁸ This exception reflects the view that dissenting
2 political speech, beliefs, or affiliations from a policymaker is disruptive enough that
3 the government's interests will necessarily permit patronage-based dismissals.⁴⁹
4 However, "the exception is 'narrow' and should be applied with caution."⁵⁰ Whether
5 an employee falls within this classification is not simply a matter of labels and titles;
6 rather, "the question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party
7 affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public
8 office involved."⁵¹ Party affiliation is interpreted broadly to encompass political
9 affiliation more generally, which "includes commonality of political purpose and
10 support."⁵²

11

12

13

2. Dr. Blandford's position as the chief of psychiatry at API

14

15 As a threshold matter, Defendants argue that they cannot be liable to
16 Dr. Blanford for any First Amendment violation because Dr. Blanford occupied a
17 policymaking position at API and, therefore, could be fired for purely political reasons.
18 Defendants bear the burden of establishing Dr. Blanford occupied such a position.⁵³
19 That is, they must show that political considerations are relevant to the chief of
20 psychiatry position at API. The duties of this position are not disputed and, therefore,
21

22

23

24

25 ⁴⁸ *Biggs*, 189 F.3d at 994–95 (emphasis added).

26 ⁴⁹ See *Hobler*, 325 F.3d at 1150 (noting that "some positions must be subject to patronage
27 dismissals for the sake of effective governance and implementation of policy").

28 ⁵⁰ *Hunt v. Cnty. of Orange*, 672 F.3d 606, 611 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting *DiRuzza v. Cnty. of
Tehama*, 206 F.3d 1304, 1308 (9th Cir. 2000)).

⁵¹ *Branti*, 445 U.S. at 518.

⁵² *Walker v. City of Lakewood*, 272 F.3d 1114, 1132 (2001) (quoting *Biggs*, 189 F.3d at 996).

⁵³ *DiRuzza v. Cnty. of Tehama*, 206 F.3d 1304, 1311 (9th Cir. 2000).

1 whether it constitutes a policymaking one is a question of law amenable to summary
2 judgment.⁵⁴

3 The Ninth Circuit has set forth nine factors that can be relevant when
4 determining the nature of a position for purposes of the policymaking exception under
5 the First Amendment. These factors are as follows: (1) vague or broad responsibilities;
6 (2) relative pay; (3) technical competence; (4) power to control others; (5) authority to
7 speak in the name of policymakers; (6) public perception; (7) influence on programs;
8 (8) contact with elected officials; and (9) responsiveness to partisan politics and
9 political leaders.⁵⁵ These factors do not need to be applied mechanically, but rather
10 should act as a guide to the underlying purpose and intent of the exception.⁵⁶

11 As chief of psychiatry, Dr. Blandford supervised the medical, pharmacy,
12 and social work departments at API.⁵⁷ He was involved in hiring decisions, and
13 evaluated and disciplined staff members within these departments.⁵⁸ He performed
14 administrative tasks such as running department meetings, completing documentation,
15 and ensuring compliance with various medical laws, policies, procedures, and
16 standards of care.⁵⁹ He oversaw patient care and clinical services.⁶⁰ His supervisor
17 was the CEO, and the CEO, in turn, was supervised by API's 11-member "Governing
18

24
25 ⁵⁴ *Walker*, 272 F.3d at 1132.

26 ⁵⁵ *Fazio v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco*, 125 F.3d 1328, 1334 n.5 (9th Cir. 1997).

27 ⁵⁶ *Hunt*, 672 F.3d at 611–12.

28 ⁵⁷ Docket 62-2 at 2, ¶2.

⁵⁸ Dockets 54-14 at ¶4; 62-2 at 3, ¶6.

⁵⁹ Dockets 56-4; 56-5; 54-14 at ¶4.

⁶⁰ Dockets 56-4; 56-5; 54-14 at ¶¶ 3-4.

1 Body.”⁶¹ The Governing Body “is responsible for broad policy making in accordance
2 with applicable State of Alaska laws and regulations.”⁶² Its authority is delegated to it
3 by the Commissioner of Health and Social Services, and it “is empowered to determine
4 and maintain the objectives, purposes, and values of the Hospital,” to hire and fire the
5 CEO, and approve budgets, bylaws, rules, regulations, policies, and procedures of
6 API.⁶³ Dr. Blanford was not a member of the Governing Body.⁶⁴

9 Based on the record provided, including the duties of Dr. Blanford as
10 chief of psychiatry and the structural organization of API, the Court concludes that
11 political affiliation was not a requirement for the effective performance of his job at
12 API. Gavin Carmichael, API’s CEO at that time and Dr. Blanford’s supervisor,
13 confirmed that Dr. Blanford’s support of Governor Dunleavy’s agenda and his
14 particular political affiliations had no influence on any of his job responsibilities.⁶⁵ He
15 confirmed that Dr. Blanford’s clinical judgment was not influenced by political
16 considerations.⁶⁶ Furthermore, the evidence does not show that he had contact with
17 elected officials or that he spoke on behalf of those officials as chief of psychiatry. His
18 duties were distinct and clear, involving patient care, compliance, and medical services
19 and staff management.

23
24
25
26 ⁶¹ Docket 62-2 at 2, ¶ 5; *id.* at 5; *id.* at 14.

27 ⁶² *Id.* at 17.

28 ⁶³ *Id.* at 14, 17, 19.

⁶⁴ *Id.* at 4, ¶ 11.

⁶⁵ Docket 62-1 at 8–9.

⁶⁶ *Id.* at 10; Docket 54-13 at 10.

1 Defendants argue that Dr. Blanford's control over subordinate medical
2 staff is a factor that weighs in favor of finding that his position was a policymaking
3 one. They argue that he supervised a large number of skilled medical staff, including
4 over 140 nurses. Looking at the record, however, that number is disputed. While a
5 memorandum dated June 4, 2018, from the Department of Health and Social Services
6 indicates that the duties of chief of psychiatry include supervising the nursing
7 department at API,⁶⁷ and Mr. Carmichael testified that the nursing department reported
8 to Dr. Blanford,⁶⁸ the organizational chart provided by Plaintiffs demonstrates that the
9 nursing department was overseen by a separate director of nursing, who reported to the
10 CEO.⁶⁹ Both Mr. Carmichael and Dr. Blanford stated that he only directly supervised
11 about fifteen people.⁷⁰ Even assuming the chief of psychiatry supervised the entire
12 nursing staff at API, this alone would not show that political affiliation is part of the
13 job, as simply increasing the number of medical personnel under his supervision does
14 not sufficiently demonstrate in and of itself that he affected the administration's
15 political policy goals.⁷¹

16
17
18
19
20 Defendants argue that his supervision of the nurses bled into influential
21 policy decisions, such as when he "negotiated with the nurses' union" and ultimately
22 solved a staffing issue.⁷² However, the deposition testimony that Defendants rely upon
23
24

25 ⁶⁷ Docket 56-5.

26 ⁶⁸ Docket 56-3 at 5.

27 ⁶⁹ Docket 62-2 at 5; *id.* at 2, ¶ 3.

28 ⁷⁰ Dockets 56-3 at 11; 62-2 at 2, ¶ 2.

29 ⁷¹ *Hunt*, 672 F.3d at 614 (acknowledging that merely being a supervisor is not sufficient to
show status as a policymaker).

30 ⁷² Docket 55 at 5.

1 does not support such a conclusion about Dr. Blanford's role in the staffing changes.
2 Mr. Carmichael stated in his deposition that he had asked Dr. Blanford to consider
3 API's staffing model and propose a way that would allow for continuous nursing
4 coverage at the facility, and that Dr. Blanford was able to come up with a solution that
5 eventually was implemented.⁷³ There was nothing said about Dr. Blanford himself
6 advancing this solution or negotiating with the nurses' union. Indeed, there is nothing
7 in the record to suggest he had such authority.

8
9
10 To the contrary, Dr. Blanford's ability to make consequential policy
11 decisions was constrained by the hierarchical system at API. Even as the supervisor
12 of the medical staff at API, his hiring and termination decisions had to be approved by
13 the CEO and Governing Body.⁷⁴ Similarly, his ability to implement or change policies
14 and practices at API was limited. Decisions involving clinical administrative matters,
15 whether initiated by him as chief of psychiatry or by the CEO, had to be considered
16 and approved by the Governing Body, which would take those matters to the applicable
17 commissioners as necessary.⁷⁵ Any medical policies and procedures developed by him
18 as the chief were designed to meet medical standards of care, not policy agendas, and
19 even those items had to be approved by the Governing Body to go into effect.⁷⁶

20
21 Defendants also point to Dr. Blanford's salary of \$298,000 a year, one
22 of the top salaries in the executive branch, as a factor suggesting he qualifies as a
23
24
25

26
27 ⁷³ Docket 56-3 at 11.
28 ⁷⁴ Dockets 62-1 at 6; 62-2 at 3, ¶ 6; 62-2 at 14.
29 ⁷⁵ Dockets 62-1 at 7; 62-2 at 3, ¶ 8.
30 ⁷⁶ Docket 62-2 at 3, ¶ 7.

1 policymaker.⁷⁷ When Dr. Blanford was first hired as a staff psychiatrist, his salary was
2 \$273,000.⁷⁸ This salary was based on his board certification, his five years of
3 experience, and his familiarity with API.⁷⁹ Dr. Bellville, who Defendants do not claim
4 was a policymaker, was hired with a similar salary of \$262,500.⁸⁰ The evidence shows
5 that the alternative to hiring staff psychiatrists was to hire *locum tenens* psychiatrists,
6 which cost between \$550,000 and \$600,000 per year, per position.⁸¹ Given these facts,
7 Dr. Blanford's high salary had more to do with the cost required to hire a qualified
8 psychiatrist as a permanent staff member and less about the level of influence he
9 exerted over state policy and governance. The same can be said of the technical
10 competence possessed by Dr. Blandford. It is no more than any other psychiatrist
11 working at API. Defendants have failed to show how Dr. Blanford's salary and
12 competence as a psychiatrist is relevant to the overall purpose of the policymaking
13 exception to the First Amendment analysis. Given the Court's finding that
14 Dr. Blanford did not occupy a policymaking position, his termination can implicate the
15 First Amendment.

20 **3. Mass resignation demand as an unconstitutional patronage practice**

21 Plaintiffs assert their terminations under Defendants' resignation plan
22 were political in nature, raising patronage issues. As noted above, the Supreme Court
23 has held that patronage dismissals—where public employees are discharged or
24

26 ⁷⁷ Docket 56-5.

27 ⁷⁸ Docket 56-11.

28 ⁷⁹ *Id.*

⁸⁰ Docket 54-12.

⁸¹ Docket 56-11.

1 threatened with discharge solely because of their partisan affiliation or lack thereof—
2 impermissibly restrict freedoms of belief and association guaranteed under the First
3 Amendment. In cases involving patronage practices applied to employees not holding
4 policymaking positions, no balancing test is necessary because such practices
5 “unquestionably inhibit protected belief and association” and “are not narrowly
6 tailored to serve vital government interests.”⁸² The interest the government has in
7 securing effective employees “can be met by discharging, demoting, or transferring
8 persons whose work is deficient,” and the interest the government has in loyally
9 implementing its policies “can be adequately served by choosing or dismissing [only
10 those] high-level employees on the basis of their political view” under the policymaker
11 exception.⁸³

12 The seminal cases addressing unconstitutional patronage involved
13 dismissal based on party membership. In *Elrod*, a newly elected Democratic sheriff
14 discharged certain at-will employees because they did not belong to or otherwise have
15 the support of the Democratic party. The court found that conditioning public
16 employment on political activity is “tantamount to coerced belief” and inhibits
17 employees from exercising their own political beliefs.⁸⁴ In *Branti*, a newly appointed
18 public defender had threatened to dismiss two assistant public defenders on the sole
19 ground that they were Republicans. The Court, in finding a constitutional violation,
20

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 ⁸² *Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill.*, 497 U.S. 62, 69, 74 (1990).

⁸³ *Id.* at 74.

⁸⁴ 427 U.S. at 355.

clarified that “there is no requirement that dismissed employees prove that they, or other employees, have been coerced into changing, either actually or ostensibly, their political allegiance.”⁸⁵ Instead, it is enough for a plaintiff to prove that they were dismissed because they were not affiliated with the favored party.⁸⁶

In *Rutan*, the Court revisited the *Elrod/Branti* doctrine to consider whether it applies to employment actions short of dismissal. In that case, the Illinois governor issued an executive order instituting a hiring freeze, whereby state officials were prohibited from hiring any employee, filling any vacancy, or creating a new position without the Governor's express permission. Plaintiffs in that case alleged that the Governor's hiring freeze was operating as a patronage system whereby the Governor limited employment and beneficial employment-related decisions to those affiliated with his favored party to the detriment of those not affiliated with that party. The Court held that, in line with *Elrod* and *Branti*, promotions, transfers, or recalls based on political affiliation or support impermissibly infringe on public employees' First Amendment rights.⁸⁷ It found that the same First Amendment concerns underlying the decisions in *Elrod* and *Branti* were implicated by the governor's freeze:

Employees who do not compromise their beliefs stand to lose the considerable increases in pay and job satisfaction attendant to promotions, the hours and maintenance expenses that are consumed by long daily commutes, and even their jobs if they are not rehired after a “temporary” layoff. These are significant

⁸⁵ 445 U.S. at 517.

86 *Id.*

87 497 U.S. at 75.

1 penalties and are imposed for the exercise of rights
2 guaranteed by the First Amendment.⁸⁸

3 As for hiring decisions, it concluded that, under the Supreme Court's long-standing
4 precedent, "conditioning hiring decisions on political belief and association plainly
5 constitutes an unconstitutional condition" when applied to public positions that cannot
6 be considered policymaking ones.⁸⁹

7 Party affiliation of the employee is not, in and of itself, the determinative
8 factor in these cases. That is, neither active campaigning, nor affiliation with a
9 competing party, nor vocal opposition to the favored political party by the employee is
10 required to raise the issue of unconstitutional patronage. "[T]he right not to have
11 allegiance to the official or party in power itself is protected under the First
12 Amendment."⁹⁰ Consequently, to support a First Amendment claim under these
13 patronage cases, it is sufficient for the employee to show "that they were fired for
14 failing to endorse or pledge allegiance to a particular political ideology."⁹¹

15 While not as direct as the patronage practices described above,
16 Defendants' demand for the resignations of over 800 at-will employees, with
17 acceptance or rejection of each resignation dependent upon an accompanying
18 statement of commitment to state employment under the incoming administration, is
19 sufficiently analogous as to its purpose and effect to be considered an unconstitutional
20
21
22
23
24
25

26 ⁸⁸ *Id.* at 74.

27 ⁸⁹ *Id.* at 78.

28 ⁹⁰ *Galli v. N.J. Meadowlands Comm'n*, 490 F.3d 265, 272 (3d Cir. 2007).

⁹¹ *Gann v. Cline*, 519 F.3d 1090, 1094 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting *Bass v. Richards*, 308 F.3d
1081, 1091 (10th Cir. 2002)).

1 patronage practice. It is undisputed the resignation plan was designed to communicate
2 to employees that they needed to express a desire to work for the Dunleavy
3 administration in order to retain their jobs and the resignation and reapplication process
4 was the means by which they were to do this.⁹² This intent was made sufficiently clear
5 to its recipients. The resignation memorandum itself stated that Governor Dunleavy
6 was “committed to bringing his own brand of energy and direction to government” and
7 asked employees to consider whether they wanted to remain in state service.⁹³ The
8 resignation form provided to employees included a line where, after resigning their
9 position, the employee had to indicate whether they wanted to be considered for their
10 current position “with the new administration.”⁹⁴ The media reports that followed
11 solidified the nature of the request. Mr. Babcock was quoted as affirming that the
12 purpose of the mass resignation request was to have employees commit to working for
13 the Dunleavy administration and its agenda in particular, rather than just staying in
14 place as part of the usual bureaucracy.⁹⁵ He stated that “[n]o public servant should
15 ever think that they are irreplaceable,”⁹⁶ and he made it clear that their jobs were on
16 the line. Employees who did not offer a resignation would be terminated. More
17 specifically, he directed employees who did not want to “express a positive desire” to
18 work with the new administration to simply not turn in a resignation, which would,
19

⁹² Docket 64-1 at 7-11.

93 Docket 54-1

94 Docket 54-3

95 Docket 54-4

96 Docket 54-8

1 convolutedly, indicate a “wish to be terminated.”⁹⁷ In other words, to keep their jobs,
2 employees had to actually resign it as a gesture of support and then hope that the
3 incoming administration would reject the resignation based on unknown criteria.
4

5 Based on these circumstances, Defendants were requiring an ostensible
6 commitment of political support, or at least deference, in return for continued
7 employment, the effect of which was to either interfere with or chill employees’
8 exercise of protected First Amendment rights. Those that did not want to signal such
9 a commitment, like Plaintiffs, were fired. Those that complied to keep their jobs could
10 thereafter reasonably “feel a significant obligation to support political positions held
11 by their superiors, and to refrain from acting on the political views they actually hold”
12 that officials might find subversive in order to avoid dismissal.⁹⁸ As such, this threat
13 of dismissal for failure to provide the resignation as a gesture of support for the newly
14 elected governor “unquestionably inhibit[ed] protected belief and association.”⁹⁹
15

16 Defendants assert that there was nothing political about the resignation
17 plan; they issued pro forma resignation requests from at-will employees as a routine
18 part of the administrative transition process. However, the sheer scope of the demand
19 for resignations, which undisputedly went beyond what was customary during an
20 administration transition, and extended to employees not occupying policymaking
21 positions, demonstrates that the purpose went beyond routine employment action.
22
23
24

25
26
27
28 ⁹⁷ Docket 54-4.

⁹⁸ *Rutan*, 497 U.S. at 73.

⁹⁹ *Elrod*, 427 U.S. at 359.

1 They were not actually asking at-will employees to resign en masse. Rather, they were
2 asking employees to offer up their job to the new administration's express approval on
3 a basis left unclear, but with suggestive political underpinnings. Indeed, Defendants
4 did not describe it to employees as a mere formality. Rather, in connection with the
5 resignation demand, Mr. Babcock stressed that “[n]o public servant should ever think
6 that they are irreplaceable” and another transition team member stated that the
7 resignation demand served as a reminder to state employees that they work for the
8 public and that the public elected the governor.¹⁰⁰ Therefore, it functioned less as an
9 employment formality and more of a hedge against, and warning to, political dissenters
10 working in state government. At a minimum, the resignation demand had the purpose
11 and effect of infusing political concerns and considerations into the civil service
12 sector.¹⁰¹

13 The fact that actual party membership or activity did not factor into who
14 received the resignation memorandum is not dispositive here. It is sufficient if, under
15 Defendants' plan, employees faced potential dismissal, or other adverse employment
16 action, if they did not want to affiliate with a particular political ideology. Such is the
17 case here. It was made clear that by submitting a resignation, the employee was
18 actually signaling a commitment to work with the new governor and on behalf of his
19 agenda. This agenda was later described by Mr. Babcock to include support for a full
20 statutory PFD, the repeal of Senate Bill 91, reorganization of government agencies,
21
22

23
24
25
26
27
28¹⁰⁰ Dockets 54-7; 54-8.

¹⁰¹ Dockets 54-2 at 2; 54-5; 54-8.

1 pro-life issues, and a balanced state budget.¹⁰² Plaintiffs did not want to align
2 themselves with these political priorities to the extent they involved funding cuts and
3 hiring freezes that would detrimentally affect the functioning of API, and therefore
4 they did not submit their resignations.¹⁰³ They consequently were fired for this
5 exercise of their associational rights guaranteed under the First Amendment.

6

7 **4. Retaliation for the exercise of First Amendment speech**

8

9 Plaintiffs' terminations based upon their refusal to provide their
10 resignations also implicates free speech issues under the *Pickering* line of cases. The
11 Ninth Circuit has synthesized *Pickering* and its progeny into a five-factor evaluation:

12 (1) whether the plaintiff spoke on a matter of public
13 concern; (2) whether the plaintiff spoke as a private
14 citizen or public employee; (3) whether the plaintiff's
15 protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor
16 in the adverse employment action; (4) whether the state
17 had an adequate justification for treating the employee
18 differently from other members of the general public;
and (5) whether the state would have taken the adverse
employment action even absent the protected speech.¹⁰⁴

19 The plaintiff bears the burden at the first three steps of the inquiry. The fourth step of
20 the analysis represents the *Pickering* balancing test, and it is at this step where the
21 burden shifts to the government employer to show that there were legitimate
22 administrative interests involved that outweigh the employee's interest in commenting
23 about matters of public concern.¹⁰⁵

24

25

26

27 ¹⁰² Docket 64-1 at 5.

28 ¹⁰³ Docket 54-21.

¹⁰⁴ *Eng v. Cooley*, 552 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009).

¹⁰⁵ *Thomas v. City of Beaverton*, 379 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 2004).

1 As a threshold matter, Defendants argue there is no speech actually at
2 issue here. They stress that Plaintiffs were not fired for anything they said or failed to
3 say, nor were they compelled to convey any public message in order to keep their
4 jobs.¹⁰⁶ However, non-verbal conduct, such as refusing to submit a resignation, can in
5 fact be expressive. Conduct “implicates the First Amendment when it is intended to
6 convey a ‘particularized message’ and the likelihood is great that the message would
7 be so understood.”¹⁰⁷

8 That requisite intent and understanding is present here. Dr. Blanford,
9 upon reading the media reports, understood the resignation demand to be politically
10 motivated. He “did not think [he] could or should have to pledge [himself] to a political
11 agenda in order to effectively carry out [his] duties as the chief of psychiatry [at
12 API].”¹⁰⁸ He even penned an editorial stating as much. In it, Dr. Blanford indicated
13 that he wanted to continue in his role at API, but would not submit what he considered
14 to be a “symbolic gesture of deference” to a political agenda he did not necessarily
15 agree with and that actually may run counter to the best interests of patients and staff
16
17

18 ¹⁰⁶ The parties brief the issue as one of compelled speech. However, as shown by the
19 arguments made, this case does not fall neatly within the confines of that body of law. Indeed, as noted
20 by the Supreme Court in *Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty., and Mun. Emps., Council 31*, 138 S. Ct.
21 2448 (2018), except for speech that is part of an employee’s official duties, “it is not easy to imagine
22 a situation in which a public employer has a legitimate need to demand that its employees recite words
23 with which they disagree. And we have never applied *Pickering* in such a case.” *Id.* at 2473. It went
24 on to state that even if *Pickering* applied in a situation involving compelled speech in the public
25 employment context, “it would certainly require adjustment.” *Id.* Here, the speech issues are more
26 accurately viewed as expressive conduct on the part of Plaintiffs rather than speech compelled by
Defendants.

27 ¹⁰⁷ *Nunez v. Davis*, 169 F.3d 1222, 1226 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting *Texas v. Johnson*, 491 U.S.
28 397, 404 (1989)); *Thomas*, 379 F.3d at 810 (quoting *Spence v. Washington*, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11
(1974) (per curium)).

108 Docket 54-14 at ¶ 13.

1 at API.¹⁰⁹ In line with this editorial, he did not submit the resignation. Dr. Bellville
2 agreed with Dr. Blanford's position and also did not submit the resignation.¹¹⁰ Their
3 refusal to resign was intended to act as a repudiation of the political underpinnings of
4 Defendants' resignation requests, and the likelihood people understood their refusal as
5 sending such a message was indeed great. In fact, medical staff at API wrote a letter
6 to Defendants requesting that they not terminate Dr. Blanford despite his stated intent
7 not to file the resignation, which they understood to be in protest of Defendants'
8 directive.¹¹¹ Therefore, Plaintiffs' refusal to participate clearly conveyed an implicit
9 message of disapproval of the resignation demand, and therefore was expressive.¹¹²

10
11
12 Defendants also challenge the First Amendment's application in this
13 situation, arguing that the resignation request was simply a job-related directive,
14 internal to state operations, and that Plaintiffs were fired for not complying with that
15 directive. This argument touches upon the first two factors discussed above: whether
16 the expressive conduct addressed a matter of public concern, and whether it was
17 undertaken in their capacity as private citizens or public employees. Both of these
18 issues are questions of law.¹¹³

22
23
24¹⁰⁹ Docket 54-21.

25¹¹⁰ Docket 54-15 at ¶¶ 10–14.

26¹¹¹ Docket 56-6.

27¹¹² See *Nunez*, 169 F.3d at 1227–28 (holding that an employee's refusal to limit attendees at
training seminars to those court employees who had worked on her supervisor's re-election campaign
was expressive conduct on a matter of public concern).

28¹¹³ *Eng*, 552 F.3d at 1070. The issue of whether the speech was made in the employee's
capacity as a private citizen is a matter of law so long as the employee's job duties are not disputed.
Id. at 1071.

1 The inquiry into the public concern factor requires the court to undertake
2 a “generalized analysis of the nature of the speech.”¹¹⁴ The analysis considers the
3 “content, form, and context of [the expression at issue], as revealed by the whole
4 record”¹¹⁵ to decide whether it fairly relates to a “matter of political, social, or other
5 concern to the community.”¹¹⁶ “Of the three concerns, content is king.”¹¹⁷ When the
6 content of the message addresses “issues about which information is needed or
7 appropriate to enable the members of society to make informed decisions about the
8 operation of their government,” it constitutes a matter of public concern.¹¹⁸ When the
9 content involves individual personnel disputes and grievances, it does not constitute a
10 matter of public concern.¹¹⁹

14 The message Plaintiffs intended to convey by refusing to comply with
15 Defendants’ directive clearly falls within the former content category. Plaintiffs were
16 surprised to have received a resignation request, and believed the directive effectively
17 was requiring political loyalty. The infusion of politics into what normally would be
18 non-political civil service jobs is a matter that the community appropriately would
19 want to know about to make an informed decision about how the new administration
20 planned to operate. While their objection to the request was tailored to their roles as
21
22

24
25 ¹¹⁴ *Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist.*, 658 F.3d 954, 964 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Desrochers v. City of San Bernardino, 572 F.3d 703, 709 (9th Cir. 2009)).

26 ¹¹⁵ *Connick v. Myers*, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983).

27 ¹¹⁶ *Id.* at 146.

28 ¹¹⁷ *Johnson*, 658 F.3d at 965.

¹¹⁸ *Desrochers v. City of San Bernardino*, 572 F.3d 703, 710 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting *McKinley
v. City of Eloy*, 705 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983)).

¹¹⁹ *Id.*

1 psychiatrists at API, it cannot fairly be characterized as simply a personnel grievance.
2 Their refusal to comply was rooted in their concern about protecting the integrity of
3 patient care at API from political interests, which clearly is a concern that would be of
4 importance to the general public.

5 The fact that Plaintiffs' actual failure to turn in their resignations was not
6 publicly announced is not dispositive. Speech, or expressive conduct as is the case
7 here, about a matter of public concern may be protected even when made in a private
8 context to staff and superiors rather than the general public.¹²⁰ Staff at API discussed
9 the matter of resignations in a meeting and were aware of Plaintiffs' position and intent
10 not to turn in a resignation, and they in turn signaled the issue to Defendants in a letter.
11 Moreover, Dr. Blanford's intent and decision not to comply with the resignation
12 demand as a form of protest was, in fact, publicized.

13 The inquiry into whether Plaintiffs were acting as private citizens or as
14 public employees focuses on whether an employee's expressions were made pursuant
15 to official responsibilities.¹²¹ When an employee makes a statement as part of his
16 official job responsibilities, he is acting on behalf of the government, and when that
17 statement is unauthorized, incorrect, or improper, the First Amendment provides no
18 protection from disciplinary measures. Defendants argue that that Plaintiffs' failure to
19 comply with their job-related directive falls within this category—a simple refusal to
20 follow a job directive. Determining whether the conduct at issue was job related
21
22

23
24
25
26
27
28 ¹²⁰ *Thomas*, 379 F.3d at 810–11.

¹²¹ *Barone v. City of Springfield, Oregon*, 902 F.3d 1091, 1098–99 (9th Cir. 2018).

1 requires “a ‘practical’ inquiry into an employee’s ‘daily professional activities’ to
2 discern whether the speech at issue occurred in the normal course of these ordinary
3 duties.”¹²² The focus is on “whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the
4 scope of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.”¹²³ Under
5 this case law, the fact that the subject matter of the resignation request was the job
6 itself does not make Plaintiffs’ refusal to submit their resignations job related. Offering
7 up a resignation obviously was not part of Plaintiffs’ daily activities as psychiatrists at
8 API.

9 Given the foregoing analysis, Plaintiffs’ refusal to resign in these
10 circumstances is protected expressive conduct. There is no dispute that this conduct
11 was the reason Defendants fired Plaintiffs, and that they would not have been fired but
12 for this conduct. It therefore falls on Defendants to show that Plaintiffs’ First
13 Amendment rights are outweighed by the interest the government has “in promoting
14 the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”¹²⁴ They can
15 do this by demonstrating some actual disruption stemming from the message. This
16 includes speech or conduct that impairs discipline, disrupts co-worker harmony,
17 negatively impacts confidential working relationships, impedes the performance of an
18 employee’s duties, or interferes with regular operations.¹²⁵ No such showing has been
19 made, or even asserted, here. Indeed, any such disruptive effects shown in the record
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

27 ¹²² *Id.* at 1099 (quoting *Garcetti v. Ceballos*, 547 U.S. 410, 422, 424 (2006)).
28 ¹²³ *Lane v. Franks*, 573 U.S. 228, 240 (2014).

29 ¹²⁴ *Pickering*, 391 U.S. at 568.

30 ¹²⁵ *Rankin v. McPherson*, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987).

1 appear to be a product of the resignation plan itself.¹²⁶ Without any outweighing
2 interests, Defendants could not terminate Plaintiffs for their protected expressive
3 conduct without running afoul of the First Amendment.
4

5 **5. Qualified immunity**

6 Defendants argue that regardless of any underlying constitutional
7 violation, they are entitled to qualified immunity that shields them from Plaintiffs'
8 § 1983 claim for damages.¹²⁷ "The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials
9 from civil liability so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established . . .
10 constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."¹²⁸ Given the
11 Court has found a First Amendment violation, the remaining issue to be determined is
12 whether Plaintiffs' rights in relation to the demand for resignations and their
13 subsequent refusal to comply were clearly established. A right is clearly established
14 when it has a "sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing precedent."¹²⁹ The rule
15 must be "dictated by controlling authority or a robust consensus of cases of persuasive
16 authority."¹³⁰ "There does not need to be a 'case directly on point,' but existing
17 precedent must place the statutory or constitutional question 'beyond debate.'"¹³¹ The
18 right cannot be defined with a "high level of generality."¹³² This particularly is so
19

20 ¹²⁶ Dockets 54-2; 54-5; 54-7; 54-8.

21 ¹²⁷ Qualified immunity is only an immunity from suit for damages, not immunity from suit for
22 declaratory or injunctive relief. *L.A. Police Protective League v. Gates*, 995 F.2d 1469, 1472 (9th Cir.
23 1993).

24 ¹²⁸ *Mullenix v. Luna*, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (quotations omitted).

25 ¹²⁹ *Nunes v. Arata, Swingle, Van Egmond & Goodwin (PLC)*, 983 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir.
26 2020) (quoting *District of Columbia v. Wesby*, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018)).

27 ¹³⁰ *Id.* (quoting *Wesby*, 138 S. Ct. at 589–90).

28 ¹³¹ *Id.* (quoting *Kisela v. Hughes*, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018)).

¹³² *Id.*

1 when the circumstances involve quick judgments made by officials in uncertain and
2 rapidly evolving circumstances, or when an outcome is otherwise highly fact
3 dependent.¹³³
4

5 With due consideration of the case law discussed in the preceding
6 sections, the Court finds that the First Amendment violation in these circumstances
7 was clearly established and would have been known to any reasonable government
8 official. It is beyond debate based on Supreme Court precedent that it is
9 unconstitutional to require non-policymaking employees to signal a commitment to a
10 political agenda in order to retain their jobs. The purpose and effect of Defendants'
11 employment practice was the same as in the seminal cases discussed above, placing
12 Defendants on notice that their resignation plan triggered application of these long-
13 standing precedents. It is not the specific details of the patronage practice that matter
14 in the application of the case law; rather, it is whether the practice would interfere with
15 an employee's political beliefs or otherwise inhibit the political activities of public
16 employees. That effect is beyond debate here. As noted above, the nature of the
17 demand was political. As a condition to retained employment, employees had to offer
18 a resignation that represented a commitment to serve under a new governor and to
19 support his political agenda. Those that did not want to signal support of the governor's
20 political agenda would be fired. For those who gave the ostensible pledge of support,
21 the demand admittedly served as a warning that they were replaceable and that they
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

¹³³ *Id.* at 1112–13; *Gilbrook v. City of Westminster*, 177 F.3d 839, 867 (9th Cir. 1999).

1 worked for the new governor, which reasonably could be interpreted as a warning
2 against political dissension in the state workforce. This warning would be expected to
3 chill employees' political affiliations and activities that officials would consider
4 subversive to the administration's agenda. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated
5 that employment practices with this effect inhibit the right to free association.
6

7 It also is clearly established that a government employer may not
8 terminate a non-policymaking employee based upon his expressive conduct absent an
9 appropriate government interest. It is without question that Plaintiffs' terminations for
10 refusing to resign runs afoul of this law. The Ninth Circuit has specifically held that
11 when an employee intends to convey an implicit message of disapproval of an official's
12 activity by refusing to facilitate or participate in that activity, and the message relates
13 to a political matter, it is speech that implicates the First Amendment.¹³⁴ In *Nunez*, the
14 plaintiff was a court administrator who was instructed by a judge to limit attendees at
15 training seminars to those employees who had worked on the judge's campaign. In
16 protest of the directive, the plaintiff arranged for two employees who did not work on
17 the reelection campaign to attend a training seminar and consequently was fired. The
18 Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff's refusal to comply was an implicit repudiation
19 of the judge's discrimination against other employees and therefore was expressive
20

21
22
23
24
25
26 ¹³⁴ *Nunez*, 169 F.3d at 1227–28 (holding that an employee's refusal to limit attendees at
27 training seminars to those court employees who had worked on her supervisor's reelection campaign
28 was expressive conduct on a matter of public concern); *Thomas*, 379 F.3d at 809 (recognizing that a
plaintiff's refusal to acquiesce to a supervisor's treatment of another employee—by promoting that
employee against the supervisor's wishes—with an intention to convey her disapproval of the
supervisor's unlawful retaliation against that employee would be protected expressive conduct).

1 conduct that touched upon a matter of public concern. The evidence in that case
2 demonstrated that the plaintiff intended to convey a message of disapproval and that
3 her intention was understood by others. The same situation is presented on the record
4 here. Plaintiffs' refusal to resign was intended to convey disapproval of the political
5 nature of the demand and was communicated as, and understood to be, an act of protest.
6 The political nature of Plaintiffs' message was obvious, and the law clearly established
7 that the resignation request could not be considered part of their duties at API.
8 Furthermore, while the issue of the government's interest in these free speech cases
9 can hinge on disputed facts about the nature and extent of any workplace disruption,
10 no such government interest has been asserted here. Therefore, the Court cannot
11 conclude that the situation presented some fact-sensitive, content-specific analysis that
12 would make the application of existing case law uncertain.
13

14 Defendants assert they are entitled to qualified immunity, at least as to
15 Dr. Blanford's § 1983 claim, because there is no existing case law which would have
16 put them on notice that an employee operating as the head of one of the departments
17 in a state-run hospital could not occupy the role of a policymaker for purposes of the
18 First Amendment. They assert the issue is too fact dependent to clearly be established.
19 This Court disagrees. It is well understood that a non-policymaking public employee
20 cannot be fired for reasons encompassing political speech or affiliation. The
21 established case law makes it clear that determining whether an employee occupies a
22 policymaking position is a matter of that position's particular job duties and requires a
23 showing that political affiliation is a part of those job duties. Here, Defendants asked
24

1 for resignations in a manner that the Court has concluded clearly was violative of First
2 Amendment political association rights from almost all at-will employees, without any
3 regard to the particular positions they held. It reasonably would be understood that the
4 requests went to people not occupying policymaking positions, and that their demand
5 would violate at least some employees' First Amendment rights. More specifically,
6 there is no dispute about the nature of Dr. Blanford's job duties, and those duties would
7 have been well known to officials making employment decisions of this nature. As the
8 preceding analysis shows, none of his job duties suggest under the relevant factors that
9 the position of chief of psychiatry at API is one where political consideration would
10 come into play. In other words, Defendants could not have reasonably believed
11 Dr. Blanford occupied a political position in light of his clearly defined and medically
12 related job duties; indeed, there was no actual individual consideration of his position
13 prior to his termination.

14

15 **B. Plaintiffs' Free Speech Claim under Article 1, § 5 of the Alaska
16 Constitution**

17

18 The Alaska Constitution in Article 1, § 5 protects citizens' right to free
19 speech. Generally speaking, Alaska's public employee free speech cases rely heavily
20 on federal law,¹³⁵ but the Alaska Constitution is applied more broadly in protecting
21 speech.¹³⁶ Consequently, given the First Amendment violation present in the
22 circumstances here, Defendants' conduct also violated Alaska's free speech
23

24
25
26
27
28 ¹³⁵ See *Wickwire v. State*, 725 P.2d 695, 703 (Alaska 1986); *State v. Haley*, 687 P.2d 305, 312 (Alaska 1984).

¹³⁶ *Club SinRock, LLC v. Anchorage*, 445 P.3d 1031, 1037–38 (Alaska 2019).

1 protections. The Court notes, however, there is no implied private cause of action for
2 damages under the Alaska Constitution unless the case involves flagrant violations
3 where no alternative remedies are otherwise available.¹³⁷ Given the Court's ruling in
4 favor of Plaintiffs on their federal § 1983 claim, Plaintiffs cannot seek damages for the
5 state constitutional violation, only declaratory and injunctive relief.¹³⁸

6

7 **C. Good Faith and Fair Dealing**

8

9 Under Alaska law, all at-will employment is governed by an implied
10 covenant of good faith and fair dealing.¹³⁹ The covenant prohibits an employer from
11 terminating an employee for the purpose of depriving the employee of the contract's
12 benefits and from dealing with the employee in a manner that a reasonable person
13 would regard as unfair.¹⁴⁰ "Unfair actions include disparate employee treatment,
14 terminations on grounds that are unconstitutional, and firing that violates public
15 policy."¹⁴¹ Defendants ask for summary judgment on this claim. They argue that the
16 basis of Plaintiffs' good faith claim is the First Amendment violation, and they contest
17 that any such violation occurred. However, the Court has found in Plaintiffs' favor as
18 to their constitutional claims, voiding Defendants' basis for summary judgment.

19

20 Plaintiffs have not moved for summary judgment on this claim. It is
21 unclear from their complaint what additional remedies Plaintiffs seek under this claim

22

23

24

25

26 ¹³⁷ *Larson v. State*, 284 P.3d 1, 9–10.

27 ¹³⁸ *Id.*

28 ¹³⁹ *Mitchell v. Teck Cominco Alaska Inc.*, 193 P.3d 751, 760 (Alaska 2008).

¹⁴⁰ *Id.* at 761.

¹⁴¹ *Montella v. Chugachmiut*, 283 F. Supp. 3d 774, 780 (D. Alaska 2017) (citing *Crowley v. State*, 253 P.3d 1226, 1232 (Alaska 2011)).

that are not provided for pursuant to their § 1983 claim, and unclear whether Plaintiffs have reason to pursue further litigation on this issue apart from the federal claim.

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the preceding discussion, Plaintiffs' motion at docket 54 is GRANTED, and Defendants' motion at docket 55 is DENIED. The Court hereby orders as follows:

(1) Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment on their § 1983 claim for damages against Defendant Governor Dunleavy and Defendant Babcock in their personal capacities based upon the First Amendment violation articulated in the Court's order.

(2) Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment on their § 1983 claim for declaratory relief and injunctive relief, to the extent the requested relief is prospective in nature, against Defendant Governor Dunleavy in his official capacity.

(3) Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment on their free speech claim brought under Article I, § 5 of the Alaska Constitution.

Counsel are instructed to promptly confer and then, within 14 days from this order's date, to file a notice that identifies the remaining issues for litigation, including whether Plaintiffs are pursuing their state claim for good faith and fair dealing and what specific injunctive and monetary relief they seek for each claim. The notice also should suggest a schedule for resolving the outstanding issues.

1 IT IS SO ORDERED this 8th day of October, 2021, at Anchorage,
2 Alaska.
3
4

5

/s/ John W. Sedwick
6 JOHN W. SEDWICK
7 Senior United States District Judge
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28